Empirical approaches to rationality and action group
The Empirical approaches to rationality and action group is an informal discussion group that was originally called together as an effort to continue discussing philosophy despite the social distancing required in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in spring 2020. The group operates as a work in progress seminar.
The group works on a pre-read basis: works in progress are circulated a week before each informal Zoom meeting over a beverage of your choice. The texts include philosophical work on action and/or rationality that engages with the behavioural and brain sciences, as well as on adjacent topics: the theme of the group is to be broadly construed.
If you are interested in participating in our group, contact Polaris Koi at email@example.com to be added to our mailing list.
Programme for Spring-Summer 2022
All meetings are at 5 pm Helsinki time.
Hannah Altehenger (Konstanz): Too much self-control?
Annemarie Kalis (Utrecht): Normativity in social accounts of reasoning: a Rylean perspective
Polaris Koi (Turku): What are my options?
Sean Shields (Nottingham): – cancelled –
Programme for Fall 2021
All meetings are at 3 pm Helsinki time.
Maud van Lier: Conceptualizing Artificial Agency in a Neo-Gricean Framework
Olle Blomberg: Being Responsible for Another’s Action
Dane Gogoshin: Responsible Agency, Moral Autonomy, and Moral Progress
Gunnar Björnsson: Instrumental Reasons without Difference-Making
Juan Pablo Bermudez: What is the Feeling of Effort About?
Programme for spring 2021
All meetings are at 3 pm Helsinki time (1 pm UTC).
Ninni Suni: Active attention view of responsibility
Lilian O’Brien: The problems of practical knowledge
Säde Hormio: The moral agency of collectives
Hille Paakkunainen: What Ryle’s regress does and doesn’t show
Dane Gogoshin: The limitations of moral responsibility practices on moral agency
Matti Sarkia: Modeling intentional agency: a neo-Gricean account
In addition to the reading group, we sometimes host visiting speakers:
Dan Burnston: Predictive processing, Bayes, and the Cognitive Architecture of Motor Control